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COMMENT
COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTION: THE NEED
TO LEGISLATE A SOLUTION
For several years, attorneys, the computer industry, and the gov-
ernment agencies responsible for protecting intellectual property have
been concerned with the desirability and manner of giving legal pro-
tection to computer programs. Possible areas of protection are patents,
copyrights, and state unfair competition laws. This comment examines
the existing means of protection and suggests a more effective approach.
I
THE PROGRAM IN A COMPUTER SYSTEM
A computer system is generally described as having two major
parts: "hardware" and "software." 1 Hardware, the core of the computer
system, consists of the physical equipment that makes the desired com-
putations. 2 Software comprises the peripheral equipment, including
the programs used to feed data and instructions to the hardware in an
orderly fashion and to obtain and sort the outputs. 3
When a computer user has a specific problem, he contacts a pro-
grammer, who breaks the problem into its most elementary mathemati-
cal components and arranges these components into steps comprehen-
sible to the computer. The resulting program is then transferred onto
a medium such as magnetic tape or punch cards, depending on the
hardware design, and is fed to the computer hardware with the raw
data. The program is analogous to the operator of a machine; it directs
the computer along each step in assimilating data and making compu-
tations.
1 Despite the risks of oversimplification and of possibly offending professionals, this
layman's explanation of computer operations is intended only to give the average reader
a starting point in understanding the problems and the terminology.
2 There are presently two types of computers, analog and digital. Analog computers
constitute only a small part of the computer market and are of much less significance
than digital computers. This note will concentrate primarily upon the digital computer
and the programs required in its operation.
3 "Software" is a misnomer, because it embraces some of the peripheral physical
equipment such as card sorters and compilers.
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II
THE NEED FOR LEGAL PROTECTION
Although technological advances in hardware have dominated the
industry's advances in the past,4 software has now surpassed hardware
in dollar volume5 and draws most of the research attention.6 This
growth of software volume has been accompanied by a parallel growth
in the number of independent, specialized software firms.7 These firms
have developed programs to solve problems common to a number of
lessee-clients. The lessee gets the advantage of pre-testing and saves
money because development costs are spread among many users.8 Of
course, the software firms view programs as proprietary products; lack
of protection against piracy is their potential Achilles' heel.9 Conse-
quently they have organized 0 to gain patent protection," arguing that
the vital nature of the industry cloaks protection with the national
interest. Organized opposition to patent protection comes from the
hardware firms who want to retain or increase their own share of the
4 The revolutionary advances in hardware technology have been the result of de-
velopments in electronic components. The first generation of computers was built with
vacuum tubes; the second, with transistors; and today's third generation computers in-
corporate integrated circuits. A fourth generation, expected in the early 1970's will not
be as revolutionary as the last two generations, but will merely be more highly refined
versions of the basic types already in use.
There are currently 35,000 computers in use in the United States and this number
is expected to increase to 60,000 by 1970 and to 85,000 by 1975. Bylinsky, Help Wanted:
50,000 Programmers, 75 FORTUNE, March 1967, at 141, 176.
5 Burck, The Computer Industry's Great Expectations, 78 FORTUNE, Aug. 1968, at
93, 142.
6 Bylinsky, supra note 4, at 141; Nievergelt, Computers and Computing-Past, Pres-
ent, Future, IEEE SPEcTRuM, Jan. 1968, at 57, 59-60.
7 An estimated 425 software companies in the United States (N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1968, at 59, col. 3 (city ed.)) lease more than 100 programs at prices of from $600 to
$20,000. Their gross annual income is about $4 million. Software Gets a Hardsel Ap-
proach, BusNmrss WEEK, Oct. 21, 1967, at 171.
8 Common programs are leased for about 10-20% of the cost of their production.
Head & Linick, Software Package Acquisition, DATAIATION, Oct. 1968, at 22, 24.
9 BUsESS WEEK, supra note 7, at 176: "Not every software company is ready to
plunge into proprietary products. . . . [A great hindrance] is that computer programs
apparently cannot be adequately protected by existing patent and copyright laws."
10 DATAMATiON, Dec. 1967, at 17; id., Oct. 1968, at 175.
11 The [software] industry is now campaigning to have computer programs in-
cluded under the patent revisions now before Congress. One of the leaders in
the campaign ... says such protection is necessary if software companies are to
survive in competition with computer manufacturers who include programs in
their equipment prices.
BusiNEss WEEK, supra note 7, at 178.
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software market.12 However, the general practice in the industry of
tying software to hardware under a single pricing system is under
challenge from two quarters: antitrust action, 18 and merchandising
initiatives by one hardware company14 now marketing hardware and
software separately.'5
There are two strong policy-level arguments for protection. First,
there is a critical shortage of programmers. 16 Protection would combat
this in two Ways: bathing the field with greater economic security would
be an encouragement to enter the field, and duplication of effort would
be avoided by utilizing a licensing system. Second, the premise behind
12 IBM, with over 70% of the market, still domiiates the industry, but other manu-
facturers are likely to increase their share in the future.
Although program protection would apparently aid the hardware and software
companies equally, the hardware companies do not favor protection. They develop soft-
ware as a necessary adjufict of dianufacturing ahd testing hakdware. At odie time, hard-
ware manufacturers were the exclusive computer system suppliers and treated programs
like any other competitive machine component. In addition, since infringers of program
patent rights could be customers, the manufacturer is not likely to benefit from protec-
tion-an infringement suit would obviously be bad business practice.
13 The Justice ]iepartment recently instituted ah antitrUit suit against IBM; tying
arrangements will probably b a fdcal point of attack. N.Y. Times, Jail. 18, 1969, at 1,
col. 8 (dty ed.).
Courts have consistently repudiated tying practices. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 837 U.S. 293, 306-06 (1949), Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated, "Tying agreements
serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." The general rule ap-
pears to be that tying is illegal unless justified. IBM was involved in an earlier tying
case, IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), when under a single pricing system
it sold its punch cards as part of its data processing machine. IBM contended that tying
was justified in order to dssuie satisfactory performance of the machiie. IBM lost the
case when the government produced its own cards which ran the machine satisfactorily.
Now that there are hundreds of software companies selling programs, it may be difficult
for hardware manufacturers in an antitrust action to justify tying software onto hard-
ware. See generally Baldwin & McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics,
8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 743 (1963); Corbett, Licensing and Tie-In Sales: How Far Can the
Seller Go?, 9 ANTiTRusT BunL. 701 (1964); Frost, Tying Clauses and Package Licensing,
28 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 207 (1966).
14 Scientific Data System's Sigma 7 computer now has separate price tags. With
separate pricing, the software compaties Will obviously be in a better position to increase
their share of the market.
15 IBM is apparently reconsidering its pricing structure. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1968,
at 73, col. 6 (city ed.); id., Jan. 18, 1969, at i5, col. 5 (city ed.). Because it dominates the
computer field, any change by IBM will undoubtedly be followed by all other hardware
manufacturers.
16 With approximately 100,000 persons employed as programmers today, it is vari-
ously estimated that a shortage of from 50,000 to 60,000 exists. Nmvswarc, Aug. 19, 1968,
at 69; Bylinsky, supra note 4, at 141. Apparently, the demand for prbgranimers will be
considerably greater in the future. Id. at 176.
[Vol. 54:586
PROGRAM PROTECTION
patents, that successful initiative should be rewarded, applies equally
to programs.1 7 But how much protection is there under existing law?'?
III
CURRENT PROTECTION FOR PROGRAMS
Notwithstanding the reasons for giving legal protection to pro-
grams and the pressure of software companies, there has been only
limited success in obtaining effective protection on the national level.
The apparent reason is that the computer program, part science and
part art,19 is neither clearly a writing that can be protected by copyright
17 PaRsmT's Co ati'N ON THE PATENT SYsTEM, REPORT 9-3 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as PRMMENT'S COMMIsSIoN] discusses the policy reasons favoring the patent system as a
means of protecting intellectual property.
Because of the large dollar and manpower investment required to produce a pro-
gram, the rationale of protecting and encouraging investment risks applies equally to
programs. The annual estimated value of programs is from one to three billion dollars.
Reynolds, Software Protection and Software Sale, DATA PROCESSING MAG., May 1967, at
50. A single program may require the work of 1,000 programmers, Nievergelt, supra note
6, at 61, and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. The upper limit on program de-
velopment costs is a function of how difficult the program is and how much money is
available. "Installing even a relatively simple credit-information system, for example, can use
up something like 30,000 man-hours of systems analysis and programming, at about $15
per man-hour." Burck, supra note 5, at 142. Even the less costly -programs developed by
the software companies under multiple leasing arrangements may cost $60,000. BUSINESS
WEEx, supra note 7, at 171.
Persons investing such large amounts of time and expense to develop these programs
deserve and need protection, for "[t]here is no question, that a program which can cost
as much as a quarter of a million dollars to produce, but perhaps $50 or less to copy,
will attract infringers and piraters." Reynolds, supra, at 50.
18 This note briefly discusses the areas of trade secret, patent, and copyright protec-
tion to highlight the need for uniform congressional action to dear up the doubt and
confusion in these areas regarding program protection and to give adequate protection
to computer programmers. For other comments raising some of the issues in particular
areas, see Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be Patentable?, 68 COLUm. L. REv.
241 (1968); Note, Copyight Protection for Computer Programs, 64 COLUJm. L. REv. 1274
(1964); Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright
Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1541 (1968). For an excellent commentary which combines a dis-
cussion of all three areas of protection, see Note, Adequate Legal Protection for Com-
puter Programs, 1968 UTAH L. Rxv. 369,
19 The techniques of instructing the computer what to do involve both science
and art. The science of programming lies in the ability to analyze a problem and
then reduce it to a logical sequence of small steps the computer ian perform.
The art of programming, on the other hand, consists of the programmer's in-
genuity in using the basic operating steps of the machine in an endless variety
of ways.
Hodge & Mantey, Programming Words that Move Machines, 75 CHI. ENG., Jan. 1,
1968, at 79 (italics in original).
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nor an invention that can be protected by patent. Perhaps by default
rather than design, state unfair competition law has therefore been
used to fulfill the need for program protection.
A. Trade Secrecy
Unfair competition is an equitable doctrine regulating business
conduct by enforcing "business integrity. '" 20 The branch of state un-
fair competition law most relevant to program protection is trade
secrecy.21 Several writers have suggested that programmers seek pro-
tection under trade secret laws;22 the suggestion seems sound since
only limited protection can be obtained elsewhere.
To come within the purview of trade secrecy, the programmer's
prime objective must be to keep the program a secret from his com-
petitors.23 The secret may be shared with another in confidence or
with a person owing fiduciary duties to the programmer. There are
two contractual methods of creating a fiduciary duty not to disclose.
One is to procure restrictive employment contracts, whereby em-
ployees promise not to divulge secrets. 24 Another is to obtain contracts
with program lessees whereby they also promise not to divulge the
secret.25 Remedies against a person disclosing the secret include both
damages and an injunction against further disclosure.26
For a number of reasons, it is questionable whether encourage-
ment of trade secret protection is in the national interest. The chief
argument against the use of trade secrecy is that information useful
to the country is not made commonly available. Although both patents
and trade secrecy have the end of promoting competition,27 their
methods are directly contradictory and provide grounds for inevitable
conflict. Patent policy is directed toward complete disclosure, while
success in trade secrets requires concealment.28 Successful trade secret
protection might retard software development. Not only would tech-
20 See 1 H. NIMs, TiHE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPTTION AND TRADE-MAtRS § 1 (4th ed.
1947).
21 See generally R. ELLis, TRADE SEca rs (1953).
22 See Wessel, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 43 H~av. Bus. Rav., Mar.-
Apr. 1965, at 97; Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and
Copyright Laws, 81 H~Av. L. Rav. 1541, 1554-56 (1968).
23 1 NIMs, supra note 20, § 142.
24 Id. § 149.
25 Id. § 143.
26 ELus, supra note 21, § 224.
27 See Harris, Patents and Trade Secrets: Instruments of Positive Competition, 12
IDEA 631 (1968).
28 A second important aspect of the patent system is that it encourages dis-
closure of technical advances and discourages secrecy. To the extent scientific
information is kept secret, there is a strong retarding factor in the advance of
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nological advances be kept secret from potential users, but there would
necessarily be a duplication of effort by different persons seeking to
achieve the same results. Moreover, uniform national law is preferable
to dissimilar state laws in regulating interstate commerce.29
In addition to these general criticisms of the policy of trade
secrecy, there are many practical pitfalls. A trade secret is not a prop-
erty right in the same sense as is an idea or invention given monopoly
protection under patent law. And although a person can seek an in-
junction to prevent illegal disclosure of an idea given in confidence,30
there are many ways in which a secret may be legally disclosed. Once
it is so disclosed, there will be no protection.31 Legal disclosure can
occur by publication,3 2 "by accident, by independent invention or
discovery, by inspection of the proprietor's goods on the open market,
or in any circumstances in which no duty of confidence is imposed., 33
Also, since the software industry increases program exposure by leasing
technology. The free flow of both basic and applied scientific knowledge is ab-
solutely essential to the most rapid rate of progress and maximum utilization
of our scientific resources. . . There are many fields where trade secrets are
now the practical substitute or alternative to patent protection . . . To the
extent secrets such as these are relied upon and maintained, the patent system
has failed and the interchange of scientific information is retarded.
Frost, Patent Rights and the Stimulation of Technical Change, in PATENTS AND PROGRESS
61, 67-68 (Anderson, Terpstra & Shapiro eds. 1965), quoted in Adelman, Trade Secrets
and Federal Pre-Emption-The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
713 (1967).
29 The uniform body of substantive federal trade secret law developed before Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was discarded after that decision. Since 1938 the
states have developed their own trade secret law with little uniformity or certainty. It
is likely that the variations in state law will hinder blanket program protection. For
a summary of the problem and suggested future approaches, see Dole, The Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Another Step Toward a National Law of Unfair Trade
Practices, 51 MINN. L. Rlv. 1005 (1967); Lunsford, Trademarks and Unfair Competition:
Need for Uniform State Laws, 58 TRADEmAR RE. 77 (1968); Note, The Trade Secret
Quagmire-A Proposed Federal Solution, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1966).
30 See ELLIS, supra note 21, §§ 6, 8; 1 NIMs, supra note 20, § 141.
31 See Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D. Md. 1962). In discussing
plaintiff's claim to trade secrecy protection for a nut-spinner, the court describes what
may happen to this protection when a device is marketed:
Here there is no information that can be kept secret, as the nut-spinner itself
fully reveals its elements and the manner of its construction. The secret is
worthless unless the device is marketed; and, once the device is marketed, the
secrecy evaporates. The evanescent value of the information never materializes.
Although such value might be given substance by the patent and copyright laws,
it cannot be coined by hollow confidence.
Id. at 187. Computer programs have the same disadvantage as the nut-spinner; despite
its complexity, the elements of the program are dearly apparent, and there is no process
or mathematical formula behind it that will not appear on the face of the program.
32 1 NiMs, supra note 20, § 146.
33 Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Anti-
trust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1432, 1448 (1967).
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programs to many users, keeping a program secret is unlikely not-
withstanding restrictive contract provisions obtained from the im-
mediate lessee-others not bound by the contract may legally disclose
the program.
A further area of uncertainty concerning state trade secret law
has arisen as a result of the Sears3 4 and Compco35 cases. In Sears, plain-
tiff invented and patented a lamp. Thereafter Sears marketed a replica
of the lamp, and plaintiff sued in the federal courts for patent in-
fringement. The lower courts found that the lamp failed the patent
law's inventiveness requirement but held Sears liable under state
unfair competition laws because of a "likelihood Of confision . . . as
to the source of the lamps."36 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the federal patent policy preempted state unfair competition laws
in this area. States thus could not extend protection which was un-
available within the framework of the federal patent system. Because
many statements in the opinion can be used to exclude state protection
of computer programs under trade secret law,37 this is an area of un-
certainty. However, some state court decisions since Sears have ap-
parently held that state unfair competition laws are not appreciably
affected.38
B. Copyright Protection
Much has been published regarding the need for copyright pro-
tection 9 and considering whether programs are writings within the
34 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
35 Compcb Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (i964).
36 Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 1i5; 118 (7th Cir. 1963) (footnbte
omitted).
3T Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it can-
not, under some other law, such as that forbidding unlfair competition, give pro-
tection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.
•.. To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the
copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented
would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which fed-
eral law has said belongs to the public. .. .This would be too great an en-
croachment on the federal pitent system to be tolerated.
376 U.S. at 231-32. Since programs can be copyrighted and are theoretically patentable,
the language would apparently mean that states are preempted from giving trade secret
protection to computer programs. However, until programs are actually permitted real
patent protection one could argue a distinction between Sears where the lamp, if novel,
could have been patented and programs which have not been given patent protection.
38 For an analysis of these decisions see Gamboni, Unfair Competition Protection
after Sears and Compco, 15 ASCAP 1 (1967); Peteison, The Legislative Mandate of Sears
and Compco: A Plea for a Federal Lav) of Unfair Competition, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 16,
28-34 (1966); Comment, The Misappropriation Doctrine after Sears-Conipc6; 2 U. SAm
FRAN. L. RFv. 292 (1968).
39 For an excellent discuission of this topic see Note, Copyright Protectidn for Com-
puter Programs, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1274 (1964).
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meaning of the statute.40 The 1908 opinion of White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Go.,41 involving the use of perforated paper
rolls in player pianos, is representative of case law development that
appears most analogous to the problems raised with program copy-
rights. At one point the opinion indicated that because these perfora-
tions were unintelligible to the average person and merely parts of
a machine, they would fail to meet copyright standards.42 There are
obvious parallels between the use of programs in computers and per-
forated rolls in player pianos; if similar reasoning were applied, pro-
grams would also fail to qualify as writings.
In contrast to the case law, however, the Copyright Office de-
cided in 1964 to permit registration of computer programs.43 Although
acknowledging its precarious position, the Copyright Office neverthe-
less adhered to its policy of resolving doubtful issues in favor of
registration and established three conditions44 for copyright registra-
tion as a Class A book.45 These conditions are fairly easily met, and
neither the courts nor Congress has yet contravened the Copyright
Office's decision.
Indeed, Congress appears willing to protect programs under the
comprehensive language of the Copyright Revision Bill. 46 The bill
contains language that apparently would include programs as copy-
rightable subject matter.47
40 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
41 209 U.s. 1 (1908).
42 The fact is clearly established in the testimony in this case that even those
skilled in the making of these rolls are unable to read them as musical composi-
tions ....
These perforated rolls 4re parts of a machine which, when duly applied
and properly operated in Cqnnection with the mechanism to which they are
adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious combination. But we cannot
think that they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act.
Id. at 18.
43 11 Copyeicnrr Soc'y BuLt. 361 (1964).
44 (1) The elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, editing, and literary
expression that went into the compilation of the program are sufficient to consti-
tute original authorship.
(2) The program has been published, with the required copyright notice: that
is, "copies" ... bearing the notice have been distributed or made available to
the public.
(3) The copies deposited for registration consist of or include reproductions in
a language intelligible to human beings. If the only publication was in a form
that cannot be perceived visually or read, something more (e.g., a print-out of
the entire program) would also have to be depQsited.
Id.
45 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.4 (1967).
46 S. 543, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
47 Section 101 of the bill, id., defines literary works as "works expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
1969]
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The availability of a program copyright is really irrelevant, how-
ever, when one considers the limited range of protection copyright
law would afford to computer programs. Unlike the Patent Office,48
the Copyright Office is not organized to deal with scientific works gen-
erally. More significantly, copyright does not carry a large umbrella of
protection, but only protects the form of expression. As stated in
Mazer v. Stein,49 "Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right
to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea-not the idea itself."50 Thus, a system of bookkeeping did not in-
fringe the copyright of a similar plan with similar results as long as
the alleged infringer made a different arrangement of columns and
used different headings.5' In addition, copyright protection is based
on originality rather than novelty.52 Thus, an identical city directory
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, or film, in
which they are embodied."
Copyrightable subject matter includes literary works and is further defined as
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id. § 102 (emphasis
added).
48 Examiners in the Patent Office generally are persons having engineering or sci-
ence backgrounds. See Railton, The Examination System and the Backlog Problem,
9 IDEA 487, 497-500 (1965).
49 847 U.S. 201 (1954).
50 Id. at 217 (footnote omitted); accord, Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir.
1926).
51 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Numerous other cases point to difficulties in
obtaining adequate program protection for form of expression rather than the idea
behind it under existing copyright laws. In Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F.2d 782 (S.D.N.Y.
1929), the court held that defendant's book on the laws of auction bridge did not in-
fringe plaintiff's copyright of a similar book. The court stated, "Defendant has not
infringed, because he has not copied the literary composition of the plaintiff's publica-
tion, but, in language quite distinctly his own, has restated the same set of conventional
precepts." Id.
Similarly, in DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 218 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962),
the court did not prohibit the use of copyrighted architectural plans in building an
identical home. Apparently, the copyright prohibited only the copying and distribution
of the architectural plans themselves. The court stated:
In the light of the established legal principle that the building of a structure
from copyrighted architectural plans is not an infringement of the architectural
plans themselves, it is difficult to comprehend how the building of a structure
amounts to a publication of the architectural plans themselves.
Id. at 196.
52 The language in some court opinions seems to confuse the law of copyrights
with that of patents. The Constitution itself differentiates between "authors" and
their "writings" from [sic] "inventors" and their "discoveries." A copyright pro-
tects an original work and is not dependent upon novelty.
Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 558 (7th Cir. 1956).
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would not infringe a previously copyrighted directory if the second
were compiled by wholly independent work.53
These cases illustrate the difficulties of obtaining adequate pro-
tection for programs under the copyright law. A program may consist
of millions of instructional steps54 that can be arranged in many dif-
ferent combinations to produce the same result.5 5 Unlike a musical
composer, a programmer is typically not interested in protecting his
particular sequence of steps; rather he is concerned with producing a
certain result and protecting the idea behind the result. If copyright
protection can be avoided by rearranging some of the steps, a pro-
grammer seeking protection'might better secrete the program. The
scarcity of program copyright registrations underscores this problem.55
C. Patent Protection
Although the software industry has not enthusiastically embraced
copyright protection, the prospect of obtaining program patents with
very broad monopoly protection seems alluring. Unlike the Copyright
Office, however, the Patent Office has showed consistent reluctance to
granting programs protection. Guidelines issued in August 196657
protect programs meeting either process or apparatus standards.58
These standards, however, are sufficiently stringent to render patent
protection exceedingly difficult to obtain. The latest Guidelines, is-
sued in October 1968,"9 essentially repeat the earlier ones in defining
potential patentability in terms of process or apparatus, but they con-
clude with the restrictive approach of the Patent Office toward pro-
gram patents: "The basic principle set forth in the foregoing guide-
lines is that computer programming per se, whether defined in the
form of process or apparatus, shall not be patentable." 60
A Presidential Commission, established to examine the patent
system, also concluded that patents should not be granted for com-
puter programs. 61 Shortly after the Commission's recommendation
53 Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
54 Bylinsky, supra note 4, at 142.
55 "There are ninety ways to write a program." Id. at 141.
5O By June 1966, only 52 programs had been copyrighted. See Note, supra note 22,
at 1550 n.91.
57 829 O.G. Pat. Off., Aug. 2, 1966, at 1-3. The same Guidelines were again
submitted in 829 O.G. Pat. Off., Aug. 16, 1966, at 865-67.
58 Patentable subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
59 855 O.G. Pat. Off., Oct. 22, 1968, at 829-30.
60 Id. at 830.
61 PBESMDENT'S COMMIssION, supra note 17, at 12: "The Commission believes strongly
that all inventions should meet the statutory provisions for novelty, utility and un-
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was issued, the Patent Reform Bill of 1967612 was introduced in Con-
gress and included a provision expressly excluding computer programs
as patentable subject matter.6 3
Case law generally reinforces the position against patentability
whether the program is viewed as a process or an apparatus.
1. Programs Viewed as Processes
Two lines of cases seemingly prohibit process patents for programs
under the present statutory interpretation of a process: the "change of
state" and the "mental step" cases.
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce
a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state
or thing.64
The Patent Office cites this statement to justify excluding program
patents as a process since no change of state occurs.65 One commenta-
tor, however, has suggested submitting a program patent application
in the form of a block diagram which indicates the change of state of
the electronic components in the computer.66 Although block diagrams
are permissible in patent applications for both electronic patents gen-
erally and computer hardware specifically, their use in these areas
is distinguishable from their use in program patent applications. First,
block diagrams for hardware symbolize an apparatus or device and not
a process. Second, the program causes only a temporary electronic
change of state in the computer components. A distinction thus exists
on the basis of the permanence of the change of state.
The mental step cases present the greatest obstacle to patenting
obviousness and that the above subject matter [including programs] cannot readily be
examined for adhereice to these criteria."
Beyond this desire to have all patent applications subject to the same criteria, the
Commission was also concerned with lack of a classification technique and search files
for programs. It was also feared that searches would be prohibitively expensive in view
of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Id. at 13.
62 H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). This
bill was not enacted into law in the last Congress but will undoubtedly be resubmitted
for consideration by the present Congress.
63 Section 106 of H.R. 5924 and S. 1042, supra note 62, states: "A plan of action or
set of operating instructions, in whatever form presented, to cause a controllable data
processor or computer to perform selected operations shall not be patentable." Industry
political pressure has probably ensured the absence of any such provision in future
patent reform legislation. Bigelow, Legal Aspects of Proprietary Software, DATAMATION,
Oct. 1968, at 32, 34.
64 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
65 855 O.G. Pat. Off., Oct. 22, 1968, at 829.
66 Note, The Patentability of Computer Programs, 38 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 891 (1963).
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programs as a process; they hold that ideas expressed as purely mental
processes are not patentable. Moreover as set forth in In re Abrams,67
if the method has both physical and mental components but only the
mental component represents an advance, a patent will be denied.
For example, color selection of an artificial eye is merely judgment, a
mental step, and is not patentable;0 8 and mathematical formulae pro-
posed on a patent application for "new and useful improvements in
Low Drag Airfoil" are likewise merely mental steps.69 Computer pro-
grams fall within the reasoning of these cases, for the novel idea in a
program is the logical arrangement of instructions, which are merely
mental processes of the programmer. All invention naturally requires
intelligent mental processes, but, to obtain a patent, such processes
must be reduced to a novel physical invention; i.e., either an apparatus
or a method resulting in a change of state.
2. Programs Viewed as Apparatus
The other suggested approach for patenting programs is as an
apparatus, since a form of the program may consist of tangible items
such as magnetic tape or punch cards, physically altered to represent
the program. This approach also fails to meet current patentability
requirements, since the program exists apart from these items. In an
analogous situation, a court held that certain business steps, consisting
of a "process for producing a periodically issued credit authorization
form,"70 were essentially mental steps in character. They could not
become patentable merely because they were imprinted on paper.71
The imprinting was only incidental to the scheme; the novel idea was
embodied in the mental business steps. Likewise, a stack of perforated
67 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951). The court seemingly accepted the rules proposed by
Abrams' counsel as applicable to process claims. Ironically, even though these rules were
accepted, the court held that Abrams' alleged invention did not meet his test. This
"seeming acceptance" has been used by the Patent Office as further grounds for rejecting
program patent applications, but th6 rule was recently rejected in In re Prater & Wei,
159 U.S.P.Q. 583 (C.C.P.A. 1968), rehearing granted, 160 U.S.P.Q. 230 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
Prater accepted as patentable an invention consisting largely of inental steps.
08 Ex parte Clarke, 97 U.S.P.Q. 165 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1952).
69 In re Shao Weh Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
70 Ex parte Appeal No. 470-27, 152 U.S.P.Q. 74 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1966).
71 [Clan a plurality of business steps involving judgement and calculation,
coupled to a printing step give rise to a patentable method?
We think not .... [A] process to be statutory must treat tangible matter.
In the instant claims, the final step, iiprinting, is the only step which could
be argued as falling within the statute. Its value as part of the methbd, however,
depends upon the significance of what is imprinted upon the sections, since
printing per se is conventional.
Id. at 75.
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punch cards, no matter how unique their perforations, are not the
ideas of the programmer. Not only are they merely incidental, but they
also fall within the A brams rule requiring the advance to be embodied
in something more than a mental step.
8. The Obviousness Standard
Even if a program could fit into either the process or apparatus
category, it seems doubtful that most could clear the additional
statutory hurdle of non-obviousness3 2 Although a "flash of genius" is
no longer required, 73 a patent will not be issued if the program "would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."7 4
Skilled programmers are not generally groping on the edge of the
unknown; with sufficient time and money, a program to solve a
particular problem within the capability of the hardware is possible.
Is this result a non-obvious invention or merely the work of a program-
mer normally skilled in the art?73 Although courts have not as yet ap-
plied this test to programs, the non-obvious requirements are clearly
stringent.7 6 Since the individual instruction steps in a program are
72 A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
73 E.g., Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 US. 84, 91 (1941): "That
is to say, the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative
genius, not merely the skill of the calling." The flash of genius cases held that a dis-
covery had to be accidental or represent a sudden insight to meet patent require-
ments. However, the statute has been amended to state that "[p]atentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
This wording is intended specifically to include situations where, as with programs, the
product is designed through methodical and purposeful research, not suddenly or by
accident. This rationale is supported by cases like Aluminum Co. of America v. Thomp-
son Prods., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1938):
The patent law has always recognized the propriety and necessity of investiga-
tion and experiment to reach a definite end; and a patent is not to be con-
demned merely because it is the result of that sort of research. A patent is not
granted only for results obtained by chance.
Id. at 184.
74 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
75 Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90 (1941): "Since
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. [52 U.S.] 248, 267, decided in 1851, it has been recog-
nized that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged position of a patent more
ingenuity must be involved than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art."
76 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966). This case described the
test: "He who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long path to tread before
reaching the Patent Office."
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generally well-known, cases indicate that the best way to qualify under
the test is to demonstrate that the particular arrangement or the
particular results produced by it are new and useful. However, here
also past cases indicate that the requirements will be difficult to meet!7
4. Cases Supporting Program Patents
Notwithstanding the foregoing reasons against patent protection
for computer programs, two cases have supported the concept of
program patents. In the 1960 case of Ex parte Egan, Kister & Scott,78
a process patent was granted for a time-saving machine operation
method. The holding itself does not support program patents, for the
patentees had developed novel, positive, and physical charts to be used
in the process.79 Dicta, however, indicated that computer programs
were analogous to the situation before the Board of Appeals."0 This
case encouraged program patent proponents, but a court did not
actually uphold a program patent until the recent case of In re Prater
& Wei.81
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Prater, a "landmark
case in patent law,' 82 reversed the Patent Office stance against program
patents by saying that the mental step and change of state cases were
not a bar to granting a patent on an analog computer program. The
applicants devised an admittedly novel method of scanning the peaks
77 The general rule was stated in Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. Oriental Rubber &
Supply Co., 231 F. 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1916). "And this court is not prepared to hold
that the taking of two steps, both obvious and not involving invention, and unpatent-
able when taken separately, involves invention and becomes patentable when taken in
unison." In Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Inter-Chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 335 (1945), the
Court rejected a patent for a quick drying printing ink when the researcher merely went
to a table of solvents and selected the one best suited in chemical properties for use in
the ink: "Reading a list and selecting a known compound to meet known requirements
is no more ingenious than selecting the last piece to put into the last opening in a jig-
saw puzzle. It is not invention." Again, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966),
the Court rejected a patent application for a plough which, although it represented an
improvement, merely combined known parts to get the desired result.
78 129 U.S.P.Q. 23 (Pat. Off. Ed. App. 1960).
79 Under the Abrams rule, a process is patentable when it contains both mental
and physical steps, and the novelty is located in the physical steps.
80 Ex parte Egan, Kister & Scott, 129 U.S.P.Q. 23 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1960).
We agree that the process under consideration is properly analogous to a method
of operating a computer, since the charts employed are quite analogous to a
preconstructed computer. The method operations in operating a computer are
distinct from the method of computation itself. It is perfectly possible to have
a patentable process in which apparatus is used in a particular way to get a
useful result.
Id. at 26.
81 159 U.S.P.Q. 583 (C.C.P.A. 1968), rehearing granted, 160 U.S.P.Q. 230 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
82 159 US.P.Q. at 594.
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of a spectrogram of a mixture of gases, and of selecting the optimum
set of peaks corresponding to the particular subset of equations needed
to determine the precise concentrations of the constituent gases in the
mixture. The claim was set forth as both a process and an apparatus,
for the applicants had also devised the electrical and mechanical com-
ponents that performed the scanning, selecting, and mathematical func-
tions of the invention.
However, mathematical computations carried out by the machine
could theoretically have been carried out mentally with the aid of
paper and pencil. The invention, therefore, was within the limitations
imposed by the mental step cases. On this basis, the patent examiner
rejected the claims under the categories of both apparatus and process,
and alternatively stated that the idea was obvious. The court reversed
this rejection by distinguishing the process cases, 3 and concluding
that they were not a bar to patent protection:
This distinction ... leads us to our present holding which is that
patent protection for a process disclosed as being a sequence or
combination of steps, capable of performante without human in-
tervention and directed to an industrial technology-a "useful
art" within the intendment of the Constitution-is not precluded
by the mere fact that the process could alternatively be carried out
by mental steps.84
Clearly this case profoundly affects the rules governing process
patents and increases the statutory limits of patentable subject matter.
But how broadly can it be read? Taken very broadly, the mental step
and change of state cases could be deemed sufficiently distinguished so
that there are fewer restrictions for all process applications. Alterna-
tively, the case can be read to permit patentability of all computer
programs, analog and digital, providing that novelty tests are met. The
application also provided a method for making the computation on a
83 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (i876), was said not to be applicable, for the
portion of that opinion dealing with change of state was dictum. "Such a result mis-
apprehends the nature of the passage quoted as dictum, in its context, and the question
being discussed by the author of the opinion." 159 U.S.P.Q. at 592.
In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951), was the biggest obstacle faced by the
court, for its rules were clear and it had been followed in several later cases. The court
distinguished Abrams on two grounds. First, the rules proposed by Abrams were not
adopted by the court and were not, therefore, holding. 159 U.S.P.Q. at 591. Second,
unlike Prater, Abrams' method claim "disclosed no means whatever for performing the
claimed steps ... of calculation and comparison. ... Thus, Abrams disclosed a claimed
process including steps which could only be performed in the mind insofar as the
teachings of the application were concerned." Id. at 590 (emphasis in original).
84 159 U.S.P.Q. at 593.
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digital computer, s5 and the court dearly pointed this out.80 If the
impact is restricted to the facts of this case, so that only analog com-
puter programs are patentable, and then only when they are an
integral part of the total process, this case may not appreciably affect
the computer industry.8 7
None of the above three approaches presently available for the pro-
tection of intellectual property appears to fit the needs of computer
program protection. Patents, depending on the ultimate disposition of
Prater, are probably not available, since the subject matter'appears to
be nonstatutory; copyright and trade secrecy fail to give adequate
protection, and the latter also runs contrary to polices favoring dis-
closure. To meet the demands for protection, in which direction
should the law proceed?
IV
PATENT PROTECTION: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
A. Considerations Favoring Patent Protection
Although new statutory provisions would be required, the best
method of program protection appears to be within the patent system.
The federal government recently started moving toward this position.
The Ninetieth Congress expressed its intent by deleting section 106
of the Patent Reform Bill of 19678 which would have specifically
exempted programs from patent protection; a federal court has de-
clared that programs should receive patent protection;8 9 and the Patent
Office has requested comments on the need for patent protection and
ways to achieve it.90 In addition to the inadequacies of the other two
principal means of protection,9' there are several positive reasons for
selecting patents as the appropriate means of protection.
85 Id. at 586.
80 Additional teaching is also provided in the present application that the steps
can alternatively be performed on other apparatus, i.e., a properly programmed
digital computer, which would equally permit the process to be performed with-
out involving steps performed in the mind by those skilled in the art informed
of appellants' novel discoveries.
Id. at 590 (italics in original).
87 The Patent Office and hardware manufacturers have strenuously objected to
this decision. The court has agreed to a rehearing of Prater in the present term. 160
U.S.P.Q. 230 (C.C.P.A. 1969). See N.Y" Times, March 1, 1969, at 43, col. 1 (city ed.).
88 Note 63 supra.
89 In re Prater & Wei, 159 U.S.P.q. 583 (C.C.PA. 1968).
90 855 O.G. Pat. Off., Oct. 15, 1968, at 555. After this request for comments,
the next issue of the Official Gazette carried the most stringent requirements to date
for patent protection of programs. See 855 O.G. Pat. Off., Oct. 29, 1968, at 829.
91 Copyright and trade secrecy are discussed at pp. 590-95 supra.
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One reason is that the general policies behind the patent system
apply to computer programs as well. The Presidential Commission on
Patents justified the patent system as socially desirable because it "pro-
vides an incentive to invent" 92 and "stimulates the investment of
additional capital." 93 Applying this "economic philosophy" 94 to pro-
grams, development of more expensive and complex programs would
be encouraged by eliminating risk of investment loss through unau-
thorized copying. Another justification for the patent system is that it
stimulates competition.95 Since software companies link their survival
in competition with hardware companies to such protection,"" and
since the hardware companies disagree, 97 resolution of this policy con-
flict is best left to Congress.
Another reason given by the Commission for maintaining the
patent system is that it encourages "early public disclosure of tech-
nological information. 98 This reasoning is certainly applicable to
92 "First, a patent system provides an incentive to invent by offering the possibility
of reward to the inventor and to those who support him. This prospect encourages the
expenditure of time and private risk capital in research and development efforts." PESi-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 2.
93 Second, and complementary to the first, a patent system stimulates the invest-
ment of additional capital needed for the further development and marketing
of the invention. In return, the patent owner is given the right, for a limited
period, to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invented product
or process.
Id.
94 The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts."
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
95 [TJhe patent system provides a protected market with the opportunity for
profit .... [T]his same protected market provides a wedge by which a business
enterprise entering a new field can overcome the obstacles that otherwise dis-
courage entry into an industry already populated .... [T]he everpresent threat
of new firms with exclusive rights to new technologies compels existing enter-
prises to explore avenues of improvement upon pain of sudden obsolescence. All
of these effects aid in generating a dynamic progressive environment. . . . It is
this encouragement of competition by the patent system which stimulates in-
vention and progress in our economy.
Address by Edward Gudeman, Oct. 18, 1961, reprinted in U.S. DErP. OF COMm., CELE-
BRATION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 11-12 (1961).
96 See note 11 supra.
97 The hardware manufacturers are afraid that patent protection might limit com-
puter use. It is felt, for example, that their customers would not know whether the
programs they are writing "are free from infringements from valid patents," and that
"the patenting process would slow the dissemination of programs." N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1968, at 59, col. 5 (city ed.).
98 Third, by affording protection, a patent system encourages early public dis-
closure of technological information, some of which might otherwise be kept
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programs, since today they are best protected by trade secrecy. By fail-
ing to afford adequate protection at the national level, the federal
government is put in the ironic position of promoting industrial
secrecy when the national interest requires that secrecy and duplica-
don of effort be avoided because of the dearth of programmers.
Subject to the ultimate disposition of Prater, current patent law
apparently does not protect programs. This is probably proper in view
of the practical problems program patents could cause. Not only would
they burden patent office processing procedures, but also it would be
difficult to fit programs into current definitions and standards of
patentability. The legal obstacle to patenting programs is the mental
step doctrine. However, programs may be distinguished from mental
step cases in several respects. A program is intimately and directly con-
nected with useful and productive hardware; it is not detachable from
the material manifestations as was the unpatentable petroleum pros-
pecting method of Abrams.99 Also, unlike the unpatentable low drag
airfoil which could have been further reduced to a tangible and useful
form,100 the program has been reduced to its most practical form. And
finally, although the coloring selection of an artificial eye was un-
patentable because it was a matter of subjective judgment,101 a pro-
gram is not wholly an art or a science but a combination of the two. 0 2
Even if the judgment aspect of a program is not patentable, the scien-
tific aspect need not be placed in the same category as a mere matter
of convenience.
The arguments against patent protection are perhaps best ex-
pressed by the President's Commission on Patents. These objections
may be summarized as follows: (1) Current classification techniques
and search files are inadequate; (2) searches would be neither feasible
nor economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art; (3) pro-
grams have had satisfactory growth in the past; and (4) copyright pro-
secret. Early disclosure reduces the likelihood of duplication of effort by others
and provides a basis for further advances in the technology involved.
PRESmENT'S CoMMissION, supra note 17, at 3.
See also Sinclair Co. v. Inter-Chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945):
The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but
the advancement of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to dis-
closure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a
certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure.
Id. at 330-31 (footnote omitted).
09 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
100 In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
101 Ex parte Clarke, 97 US.P.Q. 165 (Pat. Off. Ed. App. 1952).
102 See note 19 supra.
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tection is available. 0 3 Any proposal to change the patent law must
carefully weigh these reasons against those favoring protection.
Though valid, however, these objections are more mechanical than
doctrinal, and accordingly, they lend themselves readily to correc-
tion.104
B. Method of Approach
Changes in the patent law to encompass computer programs can
be made by the Patent Office, the courts, or the Congress. The Patent
Office has consistently shown opposition to protecting programs and is
probably not the most appropriate agency for changing the law. It
weighs the mechanical problems heavily, since including programs
would impose a tremendous burden at a time when it is desperately
trying to decrease its backlog.10 5 In addition, it must follow court de-
cisions which generally have deemed programs non-statutory subject
matter under the mental step doctrine.
The courts might also change the law, but such a change would
be inadequate since courts lack the means for hearing all sides of an
essentially political and economic issue. Also, by granting program
protection the courts could swamp the unprepared Patent Office.
Expanding patent protection to programs can best be effectuated
by Congress. Because of the sui generis nature of programs-half art
and half science-Congress should develop the new statutory standards
required. Congress has the power and flexibility to focus on other areas
of the law, like copyright and a better classification system, that will
require simultaneous attention. It also has the advantage of currently
reviewing the patent law and could expand its inquiry by calling wit-
nesses from all sides of this controversy.
Under article I, section 8 of the Constitution,0 6 Congress has
authority to extend protection under separate statutory provisions.
Design 0 7 and plant 10 8 patents are precedent for extending separate
103 PRESDENT'S COMMISSION, stpra note 17, at 12-1M.
104 See pp. 605-08 infra.
105 For the current backlog see, e.g., 856 Q.G. Pat. Off., 668 (1968), listing the
applications pending action on November 4, 1968 (total of 187,351 pending applications,
excluding Designs). The oldest case awaiting action for new application in each category
of patents was: Chemical Examining Operation-33 months; Electrical Examining Op-
eration-37 months; Mechanical Examining Operation-29 months. These figures show
a considerable improvement in the backlog over the figures cited and estimated in
Railton, supra note 48.
106 U.S. Co Nsr. art. I, § 8: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries."
107 35 U.S.C. §9 171-73 (1964).
108 35 U.S.C. 99 161-64 (1964).
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statutory provisions to those areas which are not only worthy of pro-
tection, but also sufficiently different from other areas of invention not
to fit the general standards of patentability. 0 9
C. Areas to be Considered by a Statutory Revision
The major criticism of the Commission and an obvious shortcom-
ing of the Patent Office is the present lack of an adequate classification
and file search system. This deficiency can only be compounded by
allowing program patents.110 With patent protection for programs, "a
tremendous burden will be imposed on the Patent Office, with the filing
of thousands of applications.""' To meet this problem, the classifica-
tion and search of prior art could be done by computer.112 Mechaniz-
ing the entire search procedure has been slow because the wide di-
versity of inventions defies easy classification. However, since computer
programs are quite uniform, they could be classified, for example, ac-
cording to subject matter, type of computer language, and type of
hardware for which the program is designed.
By means of such classification, a mechanized information retrieval
system could readily locate prior art for comparison with the current
program application. This mechanization is critical in program patents.
Since patents become obsolete after a relatively short time, 1 3 the cur-
rent three to five year delays would render program protection almost
worthless. A subsidiary advantage of mechanized search techniques is
that the modernized Patent Office could also serve as a clearing house
109 The President's Commission on Patents was opposed not only to program pro-
tection but also to continuing the special protection for design and plant patents.
PRESmENT'S ComussoN, supra note 17, at 12-13. The theory behind this proposal was
to make all patent applications subject to the same standards of inventiveness, and these
three categories did not fit neatly into the proposed scheme. This plan is not very
realistic, since the Commission recognizes the need for design and plant protection, but
merely declares that protection should be "outside the patent system" without specifying
where. Until a better scheme for protecting designs, plants, and computer programs is
suggested, extending patent protection would be better than leaving these areas without
any protection at all.
110 With over three million patents already granted and applications for new ones
running at the rate of 100,000 per year, the Patent Office is greatly burdened trying to
classify patents granted and then attempting to search its files for the status of the prior
art. This flood of applications has resulted in a backlog which causes delays ranging
from 3 to 5 years between the date of application and the date of the actual issue of
a new patent. See generally Railton, supra note 48.
111 N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1968, at 65, col. 2-3 (city ed.).
112 Computerizing the entire classification and search system i not a siew idea.
There have been numerous proposals, both within and outside of the Patent Office for
instituting the computerized system. See, e.g., Thompson & Church, Computer Docket and
Retrieval System, 1968 PATENT LAW ANNUAL 51.
113 Reynolds, supra note 17, at 50. "it slow iaes approkimately five years to get A
patent and few programs have five-year lives."
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for programs. Potential users could approach the Patent Office to find
out whether a program had previously been patented, and if so, could
make leasing or sale arrangements with the patentee.
Furthermore, Congress should consider basing program patents
not on the usual first-to-invent basis, but on a first-to-file basis.
The European nations which follow the first-to-file" 4 rule give patent
rights to the first person filing a valid patent application. In the
United States, however, unless there has been an abandonment," 5 the
patent will issue to the first person inventing a patentable item, re-
gardless of priority in getting to the Patent Office." 6 Critics of the
United States system label it inefficient, since it tends to cause long
and costly lawsuits between competing claimants. Defenders of the
system justify it as a protection for the workshop inventor who, un-
aware of legal technicalities, could lose proprietary rights to his inven-
tion to another who filed a prior claim. Programmers, however, are
typically not small inventors but rather are associated with large
institutions having ample knowledge of patent laws. Furthermore, a
first-to-file system for program patents will promote the prompt dis-
closure of new programs and will avoid the delays and expenses of
interference proceedings. The first-to-file system was recommended by
the Commission" 7 for all patents and was proposed in the Patent Re-
form Bill of 1967.118 This recommendation is the most controversial
section of the bill, and acceptance appears doubtful." 9 However, since
the objections to first-to-file do not apply to programs, adoption of
this system for programs only should be considered by Congress.
114 See, e.g., The Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87. § 5.
115 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1964). Under the first-to-file system, the concept of abandon-
ment would no longer be necessary.
116 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964):
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent ....
This section precludes patents for all existing programs, since they are prior art.
117 [It would] encourage prompt disclosure of newly discovered technology; sub-
stitute for the delays and expense of interference proceedings a fair and inex-
pensive means by which an inventor can establish priority; and bring U.S.
practice into harmony with that prevailing in almost all other industrial
nations.
PaRsIErr's CoMMISSION, supra note 17, at 6.
118 H.R. 5924 and S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1967).
119 The patent bar has indicated strong opposition to the first-to-file system. The
American Patent Law Ass'n, the Patent Section of the ABA, and the Patent Committee
of the Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers have all disapproved the proposal. On the other
hand, some commentators have indicated approval of the proposed change. See, e.g.,
Goldsmith, Why Not a First-To-File System?, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 699 (1967).
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Congress will face a difficult task in designating standards of
patentability for computer programs. There are two primary standards
available: the basis of novelty used by the Patent Office1 20 and the basis
of originality used in copyrights.' 2 ' Under the former test, a patent
will issue if the object of invention is a new and useful product which
did not exist previously. The originality test permits a copyright if the
form of expression is independent authorship, whether or not the art
existed previously. Of the two, the novelty test should be adopted for
program patents. The Patent Office novelty test could easily be ex-
panded to fit programs if the classification and search files were mech-
anized for rapid search. In addition, the novelty test provides greater
protection, since copying is difficult to prove in a copyright infringe-
ment action. Finally, a standard based on originality gives no protec-
tion if the same program is independently produced elsewhere. There
is, therefore, less of an incentive to check prior art. A standard of
novelty would require a routine investigation of Patent Office files,
resulting in less duplication of effort if the program already existed.
The precise standard for program patents could best be resolved in
open congressional hearings with representatives of the Patent Office,
patent attorneys, and the hardware and software manufacturing in-
dustries.
A problem related to selecting a standard of invention is whether
to follow the examination system used by the Patent Office' 22 or the
registration system of copyright.123 In the former, if examination of
Patent Office files, books, and journals reveals the existence of prior
art, a patent will not be issued. Under the registration system in the
Copyright Office, subject matter must meet certain routine standards,
but no research is conducted. Any conflict is left for litigation in the
courts. A program patent based on novelty would invariably require an
adequate system of classification and search technique in looking for
prior art. If one is not developed, then, to meet the Presidential Com-
mission's objection of burdening the Patent Office, a standard based
120 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
121 See Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956): "A copyright protects
an original work and is not dependent upon novelty"; Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 474
(4th Cir. 1953): "Since a copyright is intended to protect authorship, the essence of
copyright protection is the protection of originality rather than novelty or invention."
122 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1964): "The Commissioner shall cause an examination to be
made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it
appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall
issue a patent therefor."
There are no significant changes in the Patent Reform Bill of 1967.
123 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1964).
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on originality, accompanied by a registration system, will be necessary.
A classification system with mechanized search techniques would per-
mit the use of an examination system with the novelty standard. A
middle position, proposed in the Copyright Revision Bill,' 24 suggests
the development of more stringent rules under the registration system.
Several additional statutory determinations should be made. First,
the present system of claims on a patent 2.5 should be continued, to
enable a patentee to receive protection only for those claims made on
the application. Second, since the Patent Office will be acting as pro-
gram clearing house for potential users, each program should be ac-
companied by proof of workability for each claim. Alternatively, the
program could be tested at the Patent Office. Third, although there
are apparently no constitutional objections to issuing both patent and
copyright on the same object,126 the copyright protection, which gives
only minor protection, should be abolished, thus avoiding confusion
and contradiction between the two laws and duplication of effort by
the two offices. Fourth, state trade secret law should be preempted by
statute to avoid a conflict between state and federal agencies over
program protection. Such a statute would merely codify the Sears and
Compco decisions and prohibit further erosion of this concept by state
courts. 127 Fifth, although seventeen year monopoly protection is given
other patentable objects,128 programs, most of which are obsolete within
five years, do not require similar protection. Furthermore, shortening
the time may lead to more pressure on patentees to grant licenses.
CONCLUSIONS
In view of the need to protect computer programs and the ap-
parent limitations of copyright law and state unfair competition law
in effecting this change, the court in Prater probably reached a just
124 S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 407-09 (1969).
125 Claims are presently required for patents. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75 (1967).
126 Katona, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 47 J. PAT. Orr. Soc'y 955, 958-
60 (1965).
127 There is precedent and perhaps even a model for this preemption in the Copy-
right Revision Bill:
[A]II rights in the nature of copyright in works that come within the subject
matter of 'copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to copyright, literary property rights, or any equivalent legal
or equitable right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
State.
S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1969).
128 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
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result even though it departed fioii past cases. However, Congress
would be in a better position to make the final decision on this ques-
tion and to attend to the peripheral problems of establishing stan-
dards, setting up a mechanized classification and search procedure, and
resolving the other technical matters. Since Congress is currently in-
vestigating the Patent Reform Bill, it is appropriate for it to pass
legislation in this area. Congress need not await a decision from the
Supreme Court in Prater. If the Court overrules the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, then Congress should pass the legislation because
of the demonstrated need for protection. Alternatively, if the Codurt
agrees with Prater, then legislation will be necessary to implement
the decision. Such an abrupt change in the case law would put a
tremendous burden on the Patent Office, necessitating appropriate
legislative reforms and guidance.
Robert W. Wild
